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Subject: SPACE Digest V13 #034

SPACE Digest                                      Volume 13 : Issue 34

Today's Topics:
         Electronic Journal of the ASA - January 1991

Administrivia:

    Submissions to the SPACE Digest/sci.space should be mailed to
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Date: 7 Jan 91 20:03:57 GMT
From: pa.dec.com!rust.zso.dec.com!shlump.nac.dec.com!advax.enet.dec.com![e-mail]  (Larry Klaes)
Subject: Electronic Journal of the ASA - January 1991


                        THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF
                THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC

                    Volume 2, Number 6 - January 1991

                       ###########################

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

                       ###########################

         * ASA Membership/Article Submission Information

         * The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part Two

              - Andrew J. LePage

                       ###########################

                       ASA MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

        The Electronic Journal of the Astronomical Society of the
    Atlantic (EJASA) is published monthly by the Astronomical Society
    of the Atlantic, Inc.  The ASA is a non-profit organization dedicated
    to the advancement of amateur and professional astronomy and space
    exploration, and to the social and educational needs of its members.

        Membership application is open to all with an interest in
    astronomy and space exploration.  Members receive the ASA Journal
    (hardcopy sent through U.S. Mail), the Astronomical League's REFLECTOR
    magazine, and may additionally purchase discount subscriptions to
    ASTRONOMY, DEEP SKY, SKY & TELESCOPE, and TELESCOPE MAKING magazines.

        For information on membership, contact the Society at:

         Astronomical Society of the Atlantic (ASA)
         c/o Center for High Angular Resolution Astronomy (CHARA)
         Georgia State University (GSU)
         Atlanta, Georgia  30303
         U.S.A.

          [e-mail] or [e-mail]

          ASA BBS: [phone], 300/1200 Baud.

        or telephone the Society recording at [phone] to leave
    your address and/or receive the latest Society news.

        ASA Officers and Council -

         President - Don Barry
         Vice President - Bill Bagnuolo
         Secretary - Ken Poshedly
         Treasurer - Alan Fleming
         Board of Advisors - Edward Albin, Jim Bitsko, Bill Hartkopf
         Council - Jim Bitsko, Bill Crane, Toni Douglas, Eric Greene,
                   Larry Klaes, Paul Pirillo, Tano Scigliano, Michael Wiggs


        ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS -

        Article submissions to the EJASA on astronomy and space exploration
    are most welcome.  Please send your on-line articles in ASCII format to
    Larry Klaes, EJASA Editor, at the following net addresses or the above
    Society addresses:

        [e-mail]
        or - ...!decwrl!advax.enet.dec.com!klaes
        or - [e-mail]
        or - [e-mail]

        You may also use the above net addresses for EJASA backissue
    requests, letters to the editor, and ASA membership information.

        Please be certain to include either a network or regular mail
    address where you can be reached, a telephone number, and a brief
    biographical sketch.

        DISCLAIMER -

        Submissions are welcome for consideration.  Articles submitted,
    unless otherwise stated, become the property of the Astronomical
    Society of the Atlantic, Inc.  Though the articles will not be used for
    profit, they are subject to editing, abridgment, and other changes.
    Copying or reprinting of the EJASA, in part or in whole, is encouraged,
    provided clear attribution is made to the Astronomical Society of the
    Atlantic, the Electronic Journal, and the author(s).  This Journal is
    Copyright (c) 1991 by the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic, Inc.


                            THE GREAT MOON RACE:
                         THE SOVIET STORY, PART TWO

               Copyright (c) 1991 by Andrew J. LePage

        The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing
        to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given
        and the article is reproduced in its entirety.

        During the re-evaluation that followed the tragic failure of the
    first manned L-2 flight, SOYUZ 1, the lunar test program took a slight-
    ly different track:  Flight testing of other components would begin.
    On May 17, 1967, KOSMOS 159 was launched into orbit aboard a MOLNIYA
    booster.  The MOLNIYA was essentially a SOYUZ launch vehicle with an
    extra stage attached, usually used to launch communication satellites
    or lunar and planetary probes.  The spacecraft sent into a 203 by
    431-kilometer (126 by 268-mile) orbit was the first test of a fully
    fueled L-2 service module.  No other modules were carried.  Soon after
    reaching orbit, the craft made a single burn that placed it into a 350
    by 60,637-kilometer (218 by 37,686-mile) orbit.  This simulated the
    burn the L-2 would have to make to leave lunar orbit and return to
    Earth.  The test appeared to have been a success.

        Later that year, testing of the L-2 resumed, but this time in a
    much more conservative manner.  On October 27, an L-2 test vehicle
    named KOSMOS 186 was launched unmanned into orbit.  Three days later,
    a second L-2 named KOSMOS 188 was also launched unmanned to within 24
    kilometers (fifteen miles) of KOSMOS 186.  The first vehicle acted
    quickly and in less than one orbit the two spacecraft automatically
    docked for three hours, thirty minutes.  The two craft then separated
    to follow independent missions.  KOSMOS 186 returned to Earth the next
    day, followed by KOSMOS 188 two days later.  The original SOYUZ 1/2
    mission had finally been accomplished (except for the two-day launch
    delay of KOSMOS 188) the way Mishin and the other program managers
    originally intended it:  Without a human crew.

        As a further test, KOSMOS 212 was launched on April 14, 1968.
    KOSMOS 213 followed it the next day.  The two machines repeated the
    previous test mission faultlessly, clearing the way for manned L-2
    flights to begin - this time, hopefully, at a more careful pace.

        In the meantime, unmanned test flights of the L-1 resumed.  On
    November 21, 1967, a PROTON booster lifted off to attempt yet another
    deep space test of the L-1.  Unfortunately, bad luck struck even
    earlier than before:  The first stage of the PROTON malfunctioned and
    exploded in mid-flight.

        By comparison, the United States was having much better luck with
    their lunar program.  On November 9, 1967, APOLLO 4 lifted off the
    launch pad with the first of the redesigned APOLLO spacecraft.  That
    in itself was an accomplishment, but what set this flight apart was
    that it was the first test of the SATURN 5 rocket.  The SATURN 5
    worked well, but did experience some minor problems.  It lofted the
    unmanned APOLLO 4 into space, where its own propulsion systems were
    tested.  The final burn sent the spacecraft back towards Earth at the
    speeds it would encounter during a return from the Moon.  All went well
    and the APOLLO Command Module was recovered in the Pacific Ocean.

        On January 22, 1968, APOLLO 5 was lofted into space.  This time a
    SATURN IB was used to orbit a prototype of the Lunar Module.  All the
    tests went well.  The United States' luck had turned and they were well
    on their way towards a manned landing on the Moon sometime in 1969.

        All was not well in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet's N-1 Moon
    rocket, originally scheduled for a test flight in March of 1968, was
    slipping further behind schedule.  May was the earliest first flight
    date.  One of the major problems was with the first and second stage
    engines.  Kuznetsov and his Kuibyshev factory were in over their heads.
    It would be difficult enough to assemble and synchronize thirty engines
    for experts in the rocket field, but for builders of aircraft engines
    it was proving to be virtually impossible.  Chief Designer Mishin had
    no choice:  Glushko continued to refuse any participation of his bureau
    in the N-1 project and instead concentrated on the development efforts
    of the PROTON, which was having problems of its own.

        Similarly, the Soviet's L-3 lunar cabin was far behind schedule.
    The earliest first test flight of the L-3 in Earth orbit was at least
    mid-1969.  The Soviets were falling behind.  Still, they were moving
    along with other aspects of their project:  Eighteen cosmonauts had
    begun lunar landing training in January of 1968.  Plans and tests of
    drills to obtain sample cores, equipment carts, and other lunar tools
    were proceeding.  Their unmanned lunar exploration program had so far
    succeeded in placing two unmanned landers on the lunar surface and
    four spacecraft in orbit to photograph landing sites, observe the near
    lunar environment, and map the Moon's slightly irregular gravitational
    field.  Despite all this progress, the earliest a lunar landing attempt
    could be made was perhaps 1970 or 1971.  If the Soviets wanted to be
    first on the Moon, all they could do was work harder and hope that the
    United States' schedule would also begin to slip.  In the meantime,
    there was still the alternate plan:  The L-1 circumlunar mission to
    beat the United States to the vicinity of the Moon.

        On March 2, 1968, another attempt to place an L-1 spacecraft into
    deep space using the PROTON lifted off the pad.  This time the rocket
    succeeded in placing the L-1 named ZOND 4 (Zond is the Russian word
    for probe) into a 200 by 400,000-kilometer (124 by 250,000-mile)
    orbit.  But as before, there was a failure in an onboard system which
    made controlling the unmanned ZOND 4 difficult or impossible.  After
    one week in space, the craft re-entered Earth's atmosphere and made an
    uncontrolled landing.  The ultimate outcome of the mission is yet un-
    known in the West, but it was undoubtedly less than successful.

        Yet another L-1 deep space test flight was launched on April 22,
    1968.  This time the PROTON booster's second stage failed at an
    altitude of about forty kilometers (about 130,000 feet), effectively
    ending the mission.  Over the course of thirteen months, the four-
    stage version of the PROTON failed four times and succeeded only once.
    If a human was going to fly on this rocket, it had to be made much
    more reliable.

        At the same time, manned missions using the L-2 were about to
    begin.  As a prelude to the twin L-2 flights with a crew exchange, it
    was decided to try a simple manned docking first.  An unmanned L-2
    would be launched into orbit, followed the next day by an L-2 carrying
    a single cosmonaut.  The two spacecraft would first rendezvous and then
    dock.  After a couple of orbits the two would separate and continue on
    separate missions, returning to Earth after about three days in orbit.
    On August 28, what would have been SOYUZ 2 was launched into Earth orbit.
    Days passed and the manned L-2 was never launched.  The unmanned L-2,
    now named KOSMOS 238, returned from orbit after almost four days in
    space.

        On October 25, the Soviets tried again with the launch of another
    L-2 into orbit.  The next day, SOYUZ 2 was joined in orbit by SOYUZ 3,
    piloted by cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi.  During the first orbit, SOYUZ
    3 came to within 180 meters (590 feet) of SOYUZ 2 using automatic sys-
    tems.  Beregovoi then manually took the two spacecraft to within a
    few meters but never actually docked.  The two spacecraft drifted 565
    kilometers (351 miles) apart by the next day before SOYUZ 3 closed
    in on SOYUZ 2 again:  And again they did not dock.  Afterwards, the
    spacecraft entered separate orbits.  After four days in space both
    vehicles successfully landed.  The L-2 design had proved to be human-
    worthy, but it appeared that there was still more to be learned
    about docking.

        As the L-1 circumlunar program was gearing up for its final push,
    U.S. intelligence learned about the Soviet mission to send a manned
    spacecraft around the Moon.  As a result of this information, American
    officials changed their plans:  Originally, the first flight to the
    Moon was not planned until early to mid-1969, when the Lunar Module
    would be tested in lunar orbit.  It was now clear that the Soviets
    planned to send a man on a circumlunar mission as soon as they had at
    least two successful tests of the L-1.  This could happen any time
    during the last quarter of 1968.  During this time a manned test of
    the Lunar Module would be out of the question; it simply was not yet
    ready.  Sending just the APOLLO Command/Service Modules on a circum-
    lunar or better yet a true lunar orbit mission was possible.  APOLLO 6,
    which used a SATURN 5 in a test flight on April 6, 1968, had experi-
    enced some technical problems, but they seemed to be under control.
    If those problems could be solved and the upcoming APOLLO 7 manned
    Earth orbit test was successful, it would be decided that NASA (Nat-
    ional Aeronautics and Space Administration) could send APOLLO 8 to
    the Moon in late December.  The race was on!

        On September 15, 1968, the Soviets launched ZOND 5 on the first
    unmanned circumlunar flight of a spacecraft.  The PROTON launch vehicle
    worked flawlessly.  The ZOND 5 capsule carried a biological payload of
    plants, turtles, flies, and meal worms, as well as a camera to take
    high-resolution photographs of the Moon's "farside" for later develo-
    ping on Earth.  On its outward journey, ZOND 5 made a course correc-
    tion at a distance of 325,000 kilometers (202,000 miles).  On September
    18, it passed within 1,950 kilometers (1,210 miles) of the Moon and
    headed back to Earth.  ZOND 5 made one more course refinement at a
    distance of 143,000 kilometers (89,000 miles) on its long fall home.
    Once the spacecraft reached Earth, it would fly over the continent of
    Antarctica and skip off the atmosphere over the Indian Ocean, losing
    just enough speed to enter a suborbital trajectory that would result in
    a final re-entry and landing over Soviet territory.  Sometime before
    this maneuver, failure struck again:  The astro-orientation system,
    which was essential to steer the re-entry module during this skip-glide
    re-entry, malfunctioned.

        As a result of this error, ZOND 5 made an unplanned ballistic
    re-entry, which resulted in ten to sixteen G-loads, much higher than
    the four to seven G-loads in the skip-glide re-entry.  The result was
    that ZOND 5 landed on September 21 in the southern Indian Ocean far
    off course.  Despite the rough re-entry, ZOND 5 survived intact and
    was soon picked up by the tracking ship BOROVICHIY.  The craft was
    then transferred to the Soviet oceanography ship VASILIY GOLOVIN, which
    had it in Bombay Harbor by October 4.  ZOND 5 was then transferred to
    an An-12.  The aircraft then finished the trip to the Soviet Union.

        On October 11, 1968, APOLLO 7 was successfully launched into Earth
    orbit.  After a virtually flawless eleven-day flight, the way was
    clear for the launch of APOLLO 8 on December 21 for a lunar orbit
    mission.

        After examining the results of the ZOND 5 mission, the Soviets
    launched one last unmanned test.  ZOND 6 was successfully placed into
    a lunar trajectory on November 10.  Its mission and payload were
    virtually identical to that of ZOND 5.  On November 12, ZOND 6 came
    within 2,420 kilometers (1,500 miles) of the Moon and successfully
    executed a skip-glide re-entry, resulting in a landing in the Soviet
    Union on November 17.  Finally, the way was clear for a manned L-1
    circumlunar flight.

        The race would be close:  The launch window for the American
    mission opened on December 21.  For the Soviets, celestial mechanics
    dictated an earlier launch window between December 7 and 9 for the L-1
    mission.  The spacecraft and its PROTON booster were rolled out of the
    assembly building on December 1.  Cosmonaut Valeriy Bykovsky was chosen
    to pilot what was planned to be humanity's first flight to the Moon.
    Out on the launch pad, problems developed with the L-1.  The launch was
    scrubbed twice before time ran out.  The problem with the L-1 could not
    be fixed before the window closed.

        On December 21, APOLLO 8 lifted off to a flawless mission into
    lunar orbit, carrying astronauts Frank Borman, James Lovell, and
    William Anders.  The Soviets lost the first goal in the race to
    the Moon.

        Since a simple manned circumlunar mission would look second-rate
    compared to APOLLO 8's ten orbits of the Moon, future manned L-1
    flights were dropped.  The program would instead be used as develop-
    ment flights for future L-2 lunar missions.  In late December of 1968,
    the now repaired L-1 was rolled back out onto the launch pad, this
    time for an unmanned mission.  On January 5, 1969, the L-1 lifted off
    on top of its PROTON booster.  Upon the ignition of the second stage,
    the PROTON unexpectedly exploded.  The L-1's launch escape system
    failed to function and the rocket and spacecraft were destroyed.  If
    there had been a pilot on board, he would have undoubtedly been killed.

        Progress on L-2 flights was stepped up.  The Soviets needed more
    experience in space with the L-2 and quickly.  For the first time the
    Soviets launched a manned mission in the midst of the Central Asian
    winter.  On January 14, 1969, SOYUZ 4 was launched with cosmonaut
    Vladimir Shatalov on board.  The next day, SOYUZ 5, with Boris
    Volynov, Yevgeniy Khrunov, and Aleksey Yeliseyev, joined Shatalov in
    orbit.  Moving slowly, the two spacecraft came closer.  The next day,
    on live Soviet television, the two spacecraft docked.  After waiting
    almost two years since the original SOYUZ 1/2 mission, Khrunov and
    Yeliseyev doned their space suits, depressurized SOYUZ 5's orbital
    module, and made an EVA to transfer to SOYUZ 4.  In thirty-seven min-
    utes, they had safely transferred.  After spending four and one-half
    hours docked, the two SOYUZ spacecraft separated.  SOYUZ 4 landed the
    next day, followed by SOYUZ 5 the day after.

        After almost a year and one-half delay, the N-1 Moon rocket was
    ready for its first test flight.  A successful test flight would put
    the Soviets in the running again for a Moon landing.  The most power-
    ful rocket ever built smoothly lifted off from its pad at the Baika-
    nour Cosmodrome (Tyuratam Space Center) on February 3, 1969.  One
    minute into the flight all looked well, but trouble soon developed.
    Ten seconds later, a fire broke out in the first stage's tail compart-
    ment, resulting in the engines shutting down.  The now powerless rocket
    was destroyed by range safety officers.  Along with the first N-1, the
    chances of beating the Americans to a manned Moon landing were all but
    destroyed.

        After the successful flight of APOLLO 8, the United States set up
    a rapid fire series of test flights to reach the Moon.  No doubt they
    knew how close the Soviets really were in the race.  In the first
    quarter of 1969, the U.S. would test the Lunar Module in Earth orbit.
    In the second quarter, they would test the Lunar Module in lunar
    orbit.  Finally, in the third quarter, they would land on the Moon.
    The Soviets knew that the earliest they could land on the Moon while
    still adequately testing their hardware was 1971.  If any one of the
    American test flights failed, they might still be in the running.
    Just in case they did succeed, a new plan was devised.

        It was decided that for the time being all manned activities using
    the SOYUZ would be geared towards the development of an Earth-orbiting
    space station.  This experience, when needed, would still be useful
    for a lunar mission.  Development and unmanned testing of lunar hard-
    ware would continue in the hope that the American effort would fail
    or at least falter.  Finally, there was the Soviets' ace in the hole:
    An unmanned lunar sample return mission.  The Babakin Design Bureau,
    which designed and built the previous generation of Soviet lunar
    spacecraft, had been developing a series of new unmanned lunar
    spacecraft to be used in conjunction with a manned lunar exploration
    effort, or as its replacement if schedules slipped by many years.

        The hardware for an unmanned sample return mission was ready by
    the beginning of 1969.  If the Soviets could not be the ones to place
    the first man on the Moon, perhaps they could return the first soil
    samples from the Moon, robbing the Americans of one of their lunar
    mission justifications.  This would be an important propaganda vic-
    tory for the Soviets and could also help slow down the American Moon
    landing program.

        On January 19, 1969, the first of the new LUNA spacecraft was
    launched by the same four stage version of the PROTON as was used by
    the L-1.  Unfortunately, LUNA had the same results that the L-1 often
    had:  The PROTON failed to reach even an Earth parking orbit.

        In March, regional politics began to take its toll on the Soviet
    Moon program.  On March 3, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on the
    Ussuri River.  By March 9, Soviet forces in the Far East were put on
    full alert; on March 14, the Chinese assumed a similar posture.  Five
    days later, the two sides clashed again along the Ussuri River.  As a
    result of this emergency, the Soviet military took control of many
    civilian space facilities and personnel, including those involved with
    the now faltering Moon program.  Over the course of four months, over
    one dozen photoreconnaissance satellites were launched to observe
    Chinese troop and equipment movements.  By early May, both the Soviets
    and Chinese were moving in their nuclear weapons.  All this had a
    severe impact on the Soviets' efforts to send a spacecraft of any sort
    to the Moon.

        Meanwhile, on March 3, NASA successfully launched APOLLO 9 into
    Earth orbit to test the Lunar Module.  On April 15, a second attempt
    by the Soviets to launch an unmanned lunar sample return mission
    failed as a result of a PROTON vehicle failure.  On May 18, APOLLO 10
    was launched and successfully tested the Lunar Module in lunar orbit.
    On June 12, yet another Soviet sample return mission was launched and
    failed.  The Soviet effort was weakening miserably.  The United States
    set a mid-July launch date for their first manned lunar landing
    attempt.  The Soviets had just one more chance to upstage it.

        The second N-1 Moon rocket was brought out to the launch pad
    in June of 1969.  It may have been yet another simple test of the
    booster, but for years rumors circulated about an impending Soviet
    space spectacular that would have upstaged the Americans.  According
    to the rumors, this N-1 would carry the first L-3 lunar cabin into
    Earth orbit, where it would be joined by a fully manned L-2.  The
    launch window would allow for a course to the Moon two weeks before
    the American mission.  The L-2/L-3 combination would then leave for
    the Moon, where the L-3 would be tested in a similar fashion as the
    American Lunar Module was tested in lunar orbit during the APOLLO 10
    mission.  The L-3 test, like APOLLO 10, would bring the lunar cabin
    close to the surface but no landing would be made.

        Meanwhile, just a few days before the launch of APOLLO 11 on July
    16, an unmanned lunar sample return mission window would open and
    another unmanned spacecraft would be launched as the L-2 was return-
    ing home.  This mission would pick up a lunar sample and return it
    to Earth just before APOLLO 11 arrived home with its precious cargo.
    If the APOLLO mission was successful, the full details of the two
    missions could be kept ambiguous and humanity could be led to think
    that the Soviets had landed men on the Moon first and had the genuine
    lunar samples to prove it.  If the APOLLO 11 mission failed, they
    could be more candid:  Their manned lunar mission put them at par with
    the Americans and their unmanned program was able to obtain lunar sam-
    ples until the Soviets were ready for a manned landing.  Either way,
    the Soviets would end up with the first lunar soil samples and upstage
    the Americans.  At least that was the rumor.

        On July 3, the thirty engines of the giant N-1 were started.
    Before it could lift itself off the pad, a liquid oxygen pump on one
    of the engines broke.  The N-1 exploded with the force of a small
    nuclear bomb, destroying the rocket, whatever payload it carried, and
    its launch pad.  In addition, the powerful explosion heavily cratered
    a second N-1 pad some distance away.  It was a devastating loss.  It
    would take at least eighteen months to two years to rebuild the N-1
    launch facilities.  Barring a catastrophe of similar proportions in
    the American program, the U.S. would almost surely be the first to
    place a human on the Moon.

        Meanwhile, several kilometers away from the N-1 disaster, another
    unmanned sample return spacecraft was being prepared.  On July 13,
    just three days before the launch of APOLLO 11, LUNA 15 was success-
    fully placed on course to the Moon.  It entered a 55 by 203-kilometer
    (34 by 126-mile) orbit around the Moon on July 17, just as APOLLO 11
    was nearing its halfway point to Earth's natural satellite.  Over the
    next four days, LUNA 15 was carefully maneuvered into a lower and lower
    orbit in preparation for its landing.  Finally, just after APOLLO 11
    landed on the Moon on July 20, LUNA 15's engines ignited and the probe
    began its long descent to the lunar surface.  Four minutes later, LUNA
    15 crashed into Mare Crisium (Sea of Crises) at a speed of 480 kilo-
    meters per hour (300 miles per hour).  The final Soviet attempt to
    literally "scoop" the United States had failed.

        That night in 1969 almost every country on Earth televised
    astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin's first steps on the
    Moon, the exceptions being China and the Soviet Union.  By July 24,
    the crew of APOLLO 11 had safely returned to Earth.  The Americans had
    won the race to the Moon.

        Having lost the race to the Moon, the Soviets shifted the emphasis
    of their space program.  All future manned flights of the L-2 would
    be in support of the space station program, known as SALYUT.  Future
    flights of the L-1 and L-3 were to be used solely as technology
    demonstration flights.  There could still be an opportunity to use
    this hardware for a manned lunar landing, if the Kremlin saw some sort
    of political advantage in such a mission.  All future flights to the
    Moon by the Soviets would otherwise be unmanned.  Efforts would con-
    tinue to get the unmanned lunar sample return hardware to work.  In
    addition, this same hardware would be modified for future flights so
    that not only could sample return missions be flown, but also missions
    to land an unmanned, long-duration rover on the lunar surface, and for
    placing payloads in lunar orbit.  Development of the N-1 would continue.
    Such a heavy lift capability could be used not only for a possible Moon
    mission, but also to orbit a one hundred-ton space station that could
    compete with the U.S. space station, SKYLAB.

        Two additional flights of the L-1 were flown after the successful
    APOLLO 11 mission.  ZOND 7 was launched on August 8, 1969, where it
    flew by the Moon and landed on Soviet soil after a skip-glide re-entry
    one week later.  ZOND 8 was launched over one year later on October 27,
    1970.  It followed a mission profile similar that of its predecessors,
    but made its re-entry over the Arctic, so that it could be monitored
    from the Soviet Union.  As a result, ZOND 8 made a landing in the In-
    dian Ocean.  Unlike ZOND 5, this landing was planned.  Unknown to the
    West at the time (and possibly many of the Soviet scientists and engi-
    neers as well), this was to be the last flight of the L-1.

        The L-3 lunar cabin was finally ready for flight testing in late
    1969.  The first L-3 was to be delivered on a PROTON launch vehicle
    and tested in Earth orbit.  The first attempt, on November 16, 1969,
    failed due to yet another PROTON malfunction.  A second attempt on
    February 6, 1970, failed for the same reason.  Hoping to get at least
    some flight testing done, Soviet engineers switched to the more re-
    liable SOYUZ launch vehicle.  Because of its lower lift capability,
    only the L-3 ascent stage could be carried into Earth orbit.  On
    November 24, 1970, an L-3 ascent stage, named KOSMOS 379, was suc-
    cessfully placed into space.  Over the next six days, the craft made
    a number of maneuvers to simulate a launch from the lunar surface
    and a series of communications tests using tape recorded voices.

        Eight days after the launch of KOSMOS 379, a complete L-3 was
    finally sent on a PROTON into Earth orbit.  KOSMOS 382, as it was
    called, also made extensive maneuvers in Earth orbit, simulating a
    descent and ascent from the Moon.  Two additional tests of the L-3
    ascent stage were made:  KOSMOS 398, launched on February 26, 1971,
    and KOSMOS 434, launched on August 12, 1971.  Both test flights were
    successful, but like the L-1, the L-3 would never fly again.

        Efforts with the unmanned lunar soil sample return mission
    continued, at first with little success.  KOSMOS 300 was launched on
    September 23, 1969, but the PROTON's escape stage failed to boost the
    probe to the Moon.  KOSMOS 305, launched on October 22, suffered a
    similar fate.  A third attempt, launched on February 19, 1970, never
    made it to Earth orbit.  Finally, on September 12, 1970, LUNA 16 was
    placed on a trajectory to the Moon.  It safely landed on the Moon in
    the Sea of Fertility eight days later, where it recovered a small
    sample of soil.  After a smooth liftoff from the lunar surface, the
    return capsule of LUNA 16 landed in Soviet territory on September 20.
    The probe had made the first automated soil return from another world
    in history.  The Soviet unmanned lunar exploration effort was finally
    under way again.

        During this same time, rebuilding of the N-1 launch facilities
    and modifications to the N-1 itself continued.  On June 24, 1971, the
    booster was ready for another test flight.  All thirty first-stage
    engines ignited and the rocket slowly lifted off the pad.  Unexpectedly,
    the giant rocket began to roll.  The radio guidance link with the still
    climbing N-1 was severed.  Its guidance input now gone, the N-1 toppled
    over after only seven seconds of flight.  The N-1 pad and facilities
    were once again damaged but not destroyed, as in the last flight.

        As before, the Soviet launch facilities were repaired and the
    new problems with the N-1 were corrected.  On November 23, 1972, the
    fourth N-1 lifted off from its pad at Baikonur.  This time the rocket
    passed the seventy second mark when the first N-1 was destroyed.  All
    finally seemed to be going well.  About one hundred seconds into the
    150-second first-stage burn, the engines began to throttle back as
    programmed to keep the rocket from shaking itself apart.  Then, just
    seven seconds later, a malfunction occurred in the rocket's tail
    section and the N-1 was destroyed.  While the N-1 failures were dis-
    heartening, the engineers were not surprised by them.  It was all too
    common for the first few flights of a new rocket to fail.  All one
    could do was learn from these failures, correct the problems, and try
    again.  Everyone involved was confident that the N-1 would finally
    operate as desired.  Two more N-1 rockets were prepared, one to be
    tested in August of 1974, the other by the end of the same year.  Even
    the most pessimistic engineers and managers felt certain that the N-1
    would be operational by 1976.

        Politics were to interfere again.  The Kremlin slowly began to
    squeeze the funding for the N-1 program.  At first, Mishin was forced
    to slow down, then freeze work on the giant rocket.  Finally, in May
    of 1974, Brezhnev removed Mishin from his post with no explanation.
    The new head of the Korolev Design Bureau was the nemesis of the N-1
    project, Glushko.  One of his first actions was to cancel the entire
    N-1 project.  The two assembled N-1 rockets were dismantled and sold
    for scrap.  By this time, as a result of the American success with
    high-energy cryogenic propellants, Glushko changed his mind about the
    usefulness of liquid hydrogen as a fuel.  He set about a new develop-
    ment program to build a heavy lift rocket, not only to replace the N-1,
    but also launch the Soviet's version of a space shuttle.  This new
    launch vehicle ultimately was called ENERGIA, but it was not to make
    its first flight until 1987.

        This marked change in policy left Kuznetsov in a bad position.
    He desperately wanted to prove that his engines could do the job.
    Anxious to regain prestige for himself and his design bureau,
    Kuznetsov continued static testing of the N-1 engines through 1976.
    By the end of the test program, the engines had accumulated almost
    four hours of successful operation, one hundred times more than they
    needed to operate in a typical N-1 flight.  While Kuznetsov may have
    proved that he could develop the engines, the N-1 project was
    nevertheless dead.

        Today, very little of the Soviet lunar landing program remains.
    The L-1 and L-2 hardware has been significantly modified and upgraded
    over the passing years.  It is still used today as the SOYUZ TM manned
    ferry and unmanned PROGRESS cargo ship for supporting the Soviets'
    manned space station program, now entering its third decade.  The L-3
    hardware, or what is left of it, sits in university labs for study by
    engineering students.  The PROTON is still in use today and is even
    being offered for international commercial launchings.  The N-1 launch
    facilities were extensively modified and are now being used to launch
    the ENERGIA - much as the old APOLLO launch facilities at Cape
    Canaveral in Florida were rebuilt to support the American Space
    Shuttle program.

        In a small town outside of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, there sits
    perhaps the saddest reminder of the Soviets' manned Moon program:  A
    strange awning protects a dance floor in the middle of a park.  It is
    part of a fuel tank from one of the two N-1 rockets scrapped in 1974.

        The unmanned LUNA program was scaled back in 1973, after support
    for all lunar missions evaporated.  The last Soviet lunar flight to
    date, LUNA 24, was made in 1976.  After one and one half decades of
    work and 4.5 billion rubles spent, this is all that remains of the
    Soviets' contribution to the race to the Moon.

        Soviet missions to Earth's satellite do not appear to be entire-
    ly at an end, however.  There are currently plans to send a PHOBOS
    class probe to orbit the Moon in 1992, where it will map the lunar
    surface in detail and collect selenophysical information.  Missions
    to return soil samples from the lunar farside, perhaps in tandem with
    advanced automated rovers - once discussed in the early 1970s - may
    be reactivated again.

        There has also been talk of the Soviets eventually sending cosmo-
    nauts to the Moon, perhaps with other nations to start the construction
    of permanent lunar bases.  Should this come to pass, then the work done
    by those Soviet engineers in the race to place humans on the Moon will
    finally be completed, though more properly as a beneficial tie between
    the former contenders.

        Bibliography -

    Baker, David, THE HISTORY OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1981

    Clark, Phillip S., THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE PROGRAM, 1988

    Clark, Phillip S., "Correspondence: The PROTON Block D Stage and
         the N-1 Booster", SPACEFLIGHT (BIS), June 1990

    Clark, Phillip S., "Soviet Rocket Engine Review", SPACEFLIGHT,
         July 1990

    Gatland, Kenneth, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
     1981 and 1988

    Harvey, Brian, "Promise Unfulfilled: The Soviet Unmanned Moon
     Programme, 1969-1988", JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY
         SOCIETY (JBIS), Volume 43, Number 9, 1990

    Harvey, Brian, RACE INTO SPACE: THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM, 1988

    Hendricks, Bart, "Correspondence: Soviet Moon Rocket's Sad Fate",
     SPACEFLIGHT, December 1989

    Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET LUNAR AND PLANETARY
     EXPLORATION, 1979

    Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1980

    Johnson, Nicholas L., SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1980-85, 1987

    Johnson, Nicholas L., THE SOVIET YEAR IN SPACE 1989, 1990

    Kidger, Neville, "Glasnost and the Moon", SPACEFLIGHT, October 1989

    Newkirk, Dennis, ALMANAC OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1990

    Oberg, James E., RED STAR IN ORBIT, 1981

    Pesavento, Peter, "Soviets to the Moon: The Untold Story",
         ASTRONOMY, December 1984

        Pesavento, Peter, "A Review of Rumored Launch Failures in the
         Soviet Manned Program, Part 2: The Lunar Project/1968-1969", JBIS,
     Volume 43, Number 9, 1990

    Young, Steven, "Soviet Union Was Far Behind in 1960s Moon Race",
     SPACEFLIGHT, January 1990

    "Designer Mishin Speaks on Early Soviet Space Programmes and
     the Manned Lunar Project", SPACEFLIGHT, March 1990

    "Soviet Lunar Lander Revealed", SPACEFLIGHT, July 1990

        "Soviet Manned Lunar Mission Used Modified SOYUZ Spacecraft"
     AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, January 8, 1990

        "Soviet Moon Flight Admission", SPACEFLIGHT, September 1989

    "VOSKHOD 2 Flight Recalled", SPACEFLIGHT, June 1990

        About the Author -

        Andrew J. LePage is a member of the Boston Group for the Study
    of the Soviet Space Program, Krasnaya Orbita.  In addition to his
    interests in astronomical and space related topics, Andrew has been
    a serious observer of the Soviet space program for over one decade.

        Andrew is the author of the following EJASA articles:

        "Mars 1994", March 1990
        "The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part One", December 1990


     THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC

                       January 1991 - Vol. 2, No. 6

                         Copyright (c) 1991 - ASA

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End of SPACE Digest V13 #034
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